Introduction
Although the 2008 financial crisis affected the entire world, for the first time it was the leading industrialized nations which were more affected than the emerging countries, for whom the crisis was largely secondary in nature, in this respect making the crisis unique (IMF, 2010a) . However, its long term consequences, both direct in terms of changing strategies of foreign owned banks, and indirect in the (2009) , also in the Eurozone. They are at a similar stage of institutional development, financial and macroeconomic reform, and banking sector depth (IMF, 2010b) . Before the global crisis of 2008, they enjoyed rapid growth in the banking sector, largely due to the increased presence of foreign banks and the adaptation to the EU legal and institutional framework. However, the global financial crisis has hampered the dynamics of CEE banking sectors' growth. Thus the aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussion on the anticipated long-term impact of post-crisis regulatory and supervisory architecture, focusing on banks operating in CEE. We pose the following questions: what were the factors contributing to the efficiency of Introduction N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 4 1 its possible consequences on banks in CEE. Analyzing the impact of the financial crisis on CEE banks, we present an empirical analysis of CEE bank efficiency and competitiveness conduct of banks before and after the crisis, using DEA methodology, market competition measures and Z-score calculations.
In the concluding section we present the anticipated long-term consequences of the post-crisis regulatory and supervisory architecture on CEE banks.
Building post-crisis regulatory architecture WORKING PAPER No. 131 5 2 4 before and after the crisis (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , using DEA methodology, market competition measures and Z-score calculations. In the concluding section we present the anticipated long-term consequences of the post-crisis regulatory and supervisory architecture on CEE banks.
Building post-crisis regulatory architecture

Literature review
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Literature review
Financial supervision should ensure systemic stability, safety and soundness of financial institutions, an efficient and transparent way of conducting transactions and financial consumer protection (Kuppens et al. 2003) . To carry out these functions effectively, its organizational structure must evolve, so that just as in real life, form follows function (Acharya et al. 2009 ). Historically, banks have accepted tight regulations in exchange for market stability and strong protection, and as a result there were almost no OECD banking crises till the 1970s (Nier 2010) . Banks were safe, but inefficient, and losing market share to non-banking firms. The period of liberalisation and deregulation from the 1980s aimed at restoring bank profitability and facilitating expansion and, in consequence, dramatically influenced the scale and complexity of banking firms. Table 1 demonstrates how dramatically the biggest banks' assets have expanded in the deregulation period. In the pre-crisis period, the dominant source of bank efficiency stemmed from expansion into new markets, non depository funding and non interest-based sources of profits (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2009), and the adoption of new models for conducting banking activities, based on product synergies, scale and scope benefits and global coverage (Acharya et al. 2011) . The changes in bank scale and scope of activities were facilitated by new regulatory philosophy, exemplified by moving from the Basel 1 to Basel 2 regulatory framework, where market discipline and bank self-regulation were to replace tight supervision. The increasing complexity of banks and the expansion of conglomerate structures generated synergies between banking (regulated) business and relatively unregulated investment activities and offered
Building post-crisis regulatory architecture N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 6 2 5 expansion into new markets, non depository funding and non interest-based sources of profits (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 2009) , and the adoption of new models for conducting banking activities, based on product synergies, scale and scope benefits and global coverage (Acharya et al. 2011) . The changes in bank scale and scope of activities were facilitated by new regulatory philosophy, exemplified by moving from the Basel 1 to Basel 2 regulatory framework, where market discipline and bank self-regulation were to replace tight supervision. The increasing complexity of banks and the expansion of conglomerate structures generated synergies between banking (regulated) business and relatively unregulated investment activities and offered both new sources of income and new areas of risk (Allen et al. 2009 ).
The 2007-2009 crisis demonstrated that Basel 2 was built on many optimistic assumptions and incorrect trade-offs, namely that regulators do not understand the complexity of banking activities and that tight supervision should be replaced by market discipline. Moreover, Basel 2 facilitated bank cooperation with, and the growth of, the so called shadow banking system (Masera 2010) . Consequently, Basel 2, which looked at isolated areas of risk and focused on partially recognized threats to financial stability, turned out to be an inadequate regulatory regime and was largely responsible for the subsequent bank systemic failures in major countries.
The foundations of new European supervisory framework
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 forced banks and regulators to rethink strategic and competitive issues in banking. Banks, which for decades had been leaders in global efficiency or expansion, turned out to be most affected, requiring massive public stabilization funds and in some cases rescue by direct government intervention (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2011). The most frequent restructuring pattern for global banks turned out to be partial or total nationalization (The World Economic Forum 2010). As a result, large global banks contributed to inflated budget deficits and dramatically growing public debts in major countries, posing the danger of systemic risk (Allen et al. 2011 ). infrastructure, based on a number of newly created institutions The ESRB is a macro-prudential regulator which focuses on the prevention of systemic risk. It has no legal personality and is operationally supported by the European Central Bank. The ESRB is designed to ensure that macro-prudential and macro-economic risks are detected and dealt with. Risks to the financial system can arise from the failure of one SIFI, but also from the common exposure of large financial institutions to the same risk factors. The ESRB also has a duty to identify any serious problems arising in a member state which could endanger EU financial stability. The main tasks of the ESRB are (Giovanini 2010 , Beck et al. 2010 ):
• to establish adequate procedures to obtain information about macro-economic risks for financial stability;
• to identify macro-prudential risks in Europe;
• to decide on macro-prudential policy;
• to provide early risk warnings to EU supervisors and other relevant actors;
• to compare observations on macro-economic and prudential developments;
• to determine how to achieve effective follow-up to warnings/recommendations. An even more challenging task was to establish a pan-European micro-prudential supervisory structure, as the convergence of supervisory architecture among European countries is very low (Masciandaro et al. 2009 ). The aim to harmonize the supervisory activities in the EU had to reconcile with different national objectives and institutional arrangements (Masciandaro and Quintyn 2008 • to determine how to achieve effective follow-up to warnings/recommendations. An even more challenging task was to establish a pan-European micro-prudential supervisory structure, as the convergence of supervisory architecture among European countries is very low (Masciandaro et al. 2009 ). The aim to harmonize the supervisory activities in the EU had to reconcile with different national objectives and institutional arrangements (Masciandaro and Quintyn 2008 (CEBS 2010) . The EBA has broad competencies, including preventing regulatory arbitrage, guaranteeing a level playing field, strengthening international supervisory coordination, promoting supervisory convergence and providing advice to the EU institutions in the areas of banking, payments and e-money regulation as well as on issues related to corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting.
The main tasks of the EBA are:
• to provide opinions and develop guidelines, recommendations, and draft regulatory standards,
• to contribute to a common supervisory culture, ensuring consistent and effective application of the EU Acts,
• to develop common reporting standards (COREP), including credit, market, operational, and equity capital adequacy ratios,
• to prevent regulatory arbitrage, mediating and settling disagreements between competent authorities and taking actions, in emergency situations,
• to improve the cooperation of supervisory authorities and to conduct peer review analyses,
• to cooperate with the ESRB,
• to foster depositor and investor protection, improve transparency and disclosure of information.
Before the crisis, there was a discussion as to whether banking supervision in the EU should be centralized in the ECB. After the crisis, one of the arguments for placing it within an independent external institution (EBA) was that national supervisors in the EU follow very diverse models: independent integrated institution, supervision centralized in the central bank, or the so called "twin peaks" model with partial centralization in two independent authorities. The composition of the ECB supervisory board illustrates it well: out of a total of 27 EBA supervisory board members, 14 are national central banks and 13 are independent authorities (EBA 2011).
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New European supervisory architecture and the CEE
The new European supervisory architecture, which took effect in 2011, has been the result of a negative assessment of pre-crisis supervisory structures in highly developed countries. The European System of Financial Supervisors has potentially far-reaching powers, which may be in conflict with national supervisory authorities,
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The new European supervisory architecture, which too result of a negative assessment of pre-crisis supe developed countries. The European System of Financi far-reaching powers, which may be in conflict with na which is a source of apprehension both in old and new EU members. The emerging complex structure, based on a number of new regulatory agencies, may not produce the desired more efficient and stable European financial system. There may be some areas of confusion as to the degree of authority and overlapping areas of regulation, particularly between the EBA and national regulatory bodies areas of confusion as to the degree of authority and overlapping areas of regulation, particularly between the EBA and national regulatory bodies CEE countries are host markets to global banks, hence regulators are afraid of further diminishing of their powers. As was noted by the member of the Czech NCB Board, "there is no one-size-fits-all solution available for all countries". In his view, the stability of the financial sector depends on the ability to establish independent, strong and respected supervision, which constitutes an important argument for carrying out banking supervision at a national level (Lizal 2011). Shifting decisionmaking powers to global or regional financial centres may mean further marginalization for CEE countries. As CEE countries are relatively new to EU decision-making processes, they tend to be rule-takers rather than rule-makers, and the new European financial architecture will only reinforce this.
Moreover, the EU and US new institutional regulatory structures were based on the perceived necessity to deal with systemic risk. There is lively discussion about the merits of the new micro-prudential regulations, while macro-prudential solutions being considered as non-controversial, which may not necessarily be the case for CEE countries. Macro-prudential regulations entail considerable costs and regulatory burdens, particularly for countries for which systemic risk is not a major priority, such as CEE. Moreover, strong macro-prudential regulations are needed if we do not believe that "strong banks create a strong system", because of linkages and global interdependence. However, this view is not universally accepted, as crisis might be attributed rather to the problems with bank business models and lack of proper micro-prudential supervision of large banks (Nier 2010) .
Before the crisis, many countries had carried out a reform of national supervisory systems, in many cases towards a supervisory integration, according to a notion that the structure of supervision should reflect the structure of the market (i.e. integrated, synergy-based). Many countries modelled their supervision on the British FSA.
However, the UK was among countries which suffered most from the crisis and consequently has now been reforming the supervisory regime, featuring a tripartite model with two supervisory authorities under the authority of the Bank of England:
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) in charge of the prudential regulation of individual firms, the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) responsible for consumer protection and the conduct of financial markets; and the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) responsible for maintaining financial stability by monitoring and addressing systemic risk that threaten the financial sector as a whole.
The supervisory focus will be much more anticipatory and more judgment-based (Bank of England 2011).
All CEE-5 countries have adopted an integrated supervisory regime, although
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All CEE-5 countries have adopted an integrated supervisory regime, although differently placed (Apinis et al. 2010 ). In the Czech Republic, financial market supervision has been integrated into the central bank ( Neither was the increase in NPL dramatic: from 3.9% to 5% on average in the same period (ECB 2005 -2009 and IMF 2010a . Thus bank performance in CEE-5 countries was less affected by the crisis than in the old EU countries.
A relatively liberal financial sector combined with large foreign ownership has been another distinguishing feature. Poland has the largest and relatively low concentrated banking sector (the lowest C5 ratio in table 2) and a sound financial system, with low dependence on sophisticated financial instruments and relatively low leverage: total loans to total deposits around 100%. Also in the Czech Republic banks are characterized by a very conservative funding structure, based on domestic deposits. On the other spectrum, Hungarian banks display the highest degree of risk, stemming not only from high non-depository financing, but also from high dependence on foreign currency loans: 70% of banking sector loans to the private sector in Hungary has been denominated in foreign currencies (EBRD 2010). 14 The first and the most seriously affected country was Hungary; the sharpest decline in output was in Slovenia and Slovakia, both of which had seen very dynamic growth before the crisis, while Poland managed to keep in positive GDP growth and credit growth throughout the crisis. Before the crisis, CEE countries enjoyed dynamic banking sector growth and high bank profitability (average ROE above Neither was the increase in NPL dramatic: from 3.9% to 5% on average in the same period (ECB 2005 -2009 and IMF 2010a . Thus bank performance in CEE-5 countries was less affected by the crisis than in the old EU countries.
A relatively liberal financial sector combined with large foreign ownership has been another distinguishing feature. Poland has the largest and relatively low concentrated banking sector (the lowest C5 ratio in table 2) and a sound financial system, with low dependence on sophisticated financial instruments and relatively low leverage: total loans to total deposits around 100%. Also in the Czech Republic banks are characterized by a very conservative funding structure, based on domestic deposits. On the other spectrum, Hungarian banks display the highest degree of risk, stemming not only from high non-depository financing, but also from high dependence on foreign currency loans: 70% of banking sector loans to the private sector in Hungary has been denominated in foreign currencies (EBRD 2010). 14 The first and the most seriously affected country was Hungary; the sharpest decline in output was in Slovenia and Slovakia, both of which had seen very dynamic growth before the crisis, while Poland managed to keep in positive GDP growth and credit growth throughout the crisis. Before the crisis, CEE countries enjoyed dynamic banking sector growth and high bank profitability (average ROE above 20% till 2007). Despite numerous gloomy projections, the macro-economic and profitability figures remained good throughout the crisis: average CEE-5 ROE dropped to 15% in 2008 and 13% in 2009, but the C/I ratio also fell to 51% in 2009.
Neither was the increase in NPL dramatic: from 3.9% to 5% on average in the same period (ECB 2005 -2009 and IMF 2010a . Thus bank performance in CEE-5 countries was less affected by the crisis than in the old EU countries.
A relatively liberal financial sector combined with large foreign ownership has been another distinguishing feature. Poland has the largest and relatively low concentrated banking sector (the lowest C5 ratio in table 2) and a sound financial system, with low dependence on sophisticated financial instruments and relatively low leverage: total loans to total deposits around 100%. Also in the Czech Republic banks are characterized by a very conservative funding structure, based on domestic deposits. On the other spectrum, Hungarian banks display the highest degree of risk, stemming not only from high non-depository financing, but also from high dependence on foreign currency loans: 70% of banking sector loans to the private sector in Hungary has been denominated in foreign currencies (EBRD 2010). Banks in CEE have remained profitable and well-capitalized, even through the 2009 crisis year, except for Slovenia. On average, the Polish and Czech Republic top banks were least affected by the crisis, while the Hungarian ones were quickest in regaining stability and recapitalization. Austrian banks were among the first to enter CEE, followed by Italian, and later Belgian and French banks. Consequently, UniCredit, Raiffeisen and Erste are the largest CEE players (UniCredit 2010). As figure 3 demonstrates for Poland, the investment in CEE-5 banks turned out to be Do safe banks create a safe system? CEE experience N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 16 3 16 very profitable, not only form pre-crisis, but also from the post-crisis perspective, and allowed mother companies to regain much of their initial investments.
However, investment in CEE carried also potential risks, mainly connected with macroeconomic imbalances, exchange rate volatility and credit risk. As a result, major global players, such as Citigroup or HSBC, had a much lower level of involvement in the region than banks from neighbouring countries. Foreign currency borrowing constitutes a significant risk in all East European countries. Before the crisis, many foreign-owned CEE banks refinanced themselves abroad and then passed on the currency risk to their clients. Macro-economic stability and expectation of currency appreciation after EU accession stimulated demand for such loans. However, FX exposure differs among CEE countries: in 2007, un-hedged foreign currency borrowing constituted more than 70% of all private sector loans in Estonia, Latvia, and Serbia; it exceeded domestic borrowing in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, but was relatively low in comparison to GDP in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Bank lending to un-hedged borrowers exposed CEE economies to systemic risk, but at the same time functioned as an engine for dynamic growth (Brown, De Haas 2011 very profitable, not only form pre-crisis, but also from the post-crisis perspective, and allowed mother companies to regain much of their initial investments.
However, investment in CEE carried also potential risks, mainly connected with macroeconomic imbalances, exchange rate volatility and credit risk. As a result, major global players, such as Citigroup or HSBC, had a much lower level of involvement in the region than banks from neighbouring countries. Foreign currency borrowing constitutes a significant risk in all East European countries. Before the crisis, many foreign-owned CEE banks refinanced themselves abroad and then passed on the currency risk to their clients. Macro-economic stability and expectation of currency appreciation after EU accession stimulated demand for such loans. However, FX exposure differs among CEE countries: in 2007, un-hedged foreign currency borrowing constituted more than 70% of all private sector loans in Estonia, Latvia, and Serbia; it exceeded domestic borrowing in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, but was relatively low in comparison to GDP in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Bank lending to un-hedged borrowers exposed CEE economies to systemic risk, but at the same time functioned as an engine for dynamic growth (Brown, De Haas 2011 (Berger and Humphrey 1997) . Technical efficiency is related to the ability of a firm to produce outputs with given inputs: a production plan is technically efficient if there is no way to produce the same output(s) with less input(s) or to produce more output(s) with the same inputs. Technical efficiency considers scale and scope economies. Among a number of DEA models, the most popular are the CCR and BCC-models. The CCR model (Charnes et al. 1978) yields an objective evaluation of overall efficiency and identifies inefficiencies. It estimates efficiency on the assumption of constant return to scale (CRTS). The BCC model (Banker et al. 1984) estimates efficiency on the assumption of variable return to scale (VRTS). It distinguishes between technical and scale inefficiencies by estimating pure technical efficiency at the given scale of operation.
Technical efficiency has been analysed assuming constant, variable and nonincreasing returns to scale. The following symbols have been applied:
• E_crs -measure of technical efficiency under constant returns to scale assumption,
• E_vrs -measure of technical efficiency under variable returns to scale assumption,
• E_n -measure of technical efficiency under non-increasing returns to scale assumption.
For the above three efficiency measures (E_crs, E_n, E_vrs), the following property also holds: 0 < E_crs ≤ E_n ≤ E_vrs ≥ 1. We should notice that VRTS technical efficiency scores are greater than or equal to CRST technical efficiency scores.
Following the scale properties of the two major DEA models (CCR and BCCmodels) we have the definition of scale efficiency: E_s = E_crs/E_vrs. If 0 < E_crs < E_vrs ≤ 1, this means that scale efficiency e_s< 1 and the given bank/firm is scale inefficient (but we do not know if it is too big or too small). Based on scale efficiency measure (E_s) only, it is not possible to distinguish in which region the given bank/firm is operating: increasing or decreasing returns to scale, to make this Do safe banks create a safe system? CEE experience N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d
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In 18 models) we have the definition of scale efficiency: E_s = E_crs/E_vrs. If 0 < E_crs < E_vrs ≤ 1, this means that scale efficiency e_s< 1 and the given bank/firm is scale inefficient (but we do not know if it is too big or too small). Based on scale efficiency measure (E_s) only, it is not possible to distinguish in which region the given bank/firm is operating: increasing or decreasing returns to scale, to make this distinction, these measures must be compared with E_n measure. If E_crs = E_n this means that bank/firm is not scale efficient and is operating with increasing returns to scale. If E_n > E_crs that bank/firm is operating with decreasing return to scale (Charnes et al. 1997) .
In The level of competition in the Polish banking sector was similar to the euro zone countries level (Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008) . A strong driver for an increase in competition in the CEE-5 banking sectors was the accession to the European Union.
In the period 2008 -2009, the slight decrease in competition resulted from the financial crisis' consequences.
CEE-5 bank efficiency and soundness
In the post-crisis period, bank risk/return preferences have shifted towards risk minimalization, both globally and in the CEE countries. However, assessing bank safety is even more difficult than assessing its efficiency. In this section, the Z-Score index of bank sensitivity to default has been adopted as a proxy measure of bank soundness. The index is based on the volatility of returns and the lack of adequate capital as the main sources of risk (Lown et al. 2000) . The Z-Score is calculated as the sum of equity capital to assets ratio (CAR) and return on assets ratio (ROA), divided by standard deviation of ROA. Thus the value of the Z-Score is determined by the level of capitalization and by the level and stability of profits, and can be interpreted as the distance from a default, measured by standard deviation of profits.
A high level in the Z-Score denotes bank stability, which means it has enough equity capital to cover potential losses. The key element, which has a considerable influence on the Z-Score, is the denominator. If the level of profitability is stable, it contributes to the high value of the index, but during unstable times (increase or decrease in profits) it causes a sudden decline in the Z-Score.
In this section the Z-Score is calculated in two different ways. by the level of capitalization and by the level and stability of profits, and can be interpreted as the distance from a default, measured by standard deviation of profits.
In The bank data were extracted from the Bankscope database. The original data set comprised all CEE-5 banks categorized as commercial or saving banks, but to prevent distortion banks with assets lower than 0.5% of the total domestic banking sector assets were excluded. That reduced the number of banks from 130 to 97. The bank data were extracted from the Bankscope database. The original data set comprised all CEE-5 banks categorized as commercial or saving banks, but to prevent distortion banks with assets lower than 0.5% of the total domestic banking sector assets were excluded. That reduced the number of banks from 130 to 97. The bank data were extracted from the Bankscope database. The original data set comprised all CEE-5 banks categorized as commercial or saving banks, but to prevent distortion banks with assets lower than 0.5% of the total domestic banking sector assets were excluded. That reduced the number of banks from 130 to 97. The bank data were extracted from the Bankscope database. The original data set comprised all CEE-5 banks categorized as commercial or saving banks, but to prevent distortion banks with assets lower than 0.5% of the total domestic banking sector assets were excluded. That reduced the number of banks from 130 to 97. 
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New European supervisory architecture and CEE-5 banks: summary of results
This paper presents an analysis of the possible impact of a new post-crisis regulatory architecture on CEE-5 banks. Economic theory provides some contrasting evidence as to the impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank performance (e.g. Barth et al. 2004 Barth et al. , 2008 Barth et al. and 2010 . Furthermore, as noted by Chortareas et al. (2011) , most research in this area concentrates on banking markets in highly developed countries.
A recent paper by Delis et al. (2011) provides some evidence on the link between regulation and supervision and bank efficiency from transition economies, which suggest a negative short term impact. In our paper, the focus has been more on the longer-term regulatory impact for CEE5 banks.
From the data presented in the empirical part of the paper, it is evident that the 2007- should be universally beneficial, also for CEE banks. However, EBA so far had a limited powers over national supervisors and was unable to deal with "too big to fail" problem. The newest EU proposals of creating Banking Union is a step to deal with this issue, by giving strong supervisory powers to ECB and creating a mechanism of shared bank rescue burden for the euro zone members. However, this is a step in new direction, changing and weakening the current European supervisory structure, before it managed to demonstrate its performance. Moreover, instead of weakening big banks, it will create another rescue vehicle for them. For CEE, with small and competitive banking sectors, it will create another mechanism for their marginalization. 
Conclusions
This paper analyses whether the new European regulatory and supervisory architecture, based on a relatively complex institutional framework, will provide more efficient supervision in the EU, thus contributing to market stability and economic growth. In assessing the cumulative effect of the new European supervisory architecture, we may conclude that it is based on a restrictive regulatory system, complex and costly, which includes many new institutions accentuating stability at the expense of market efficiency and growth. For home countries, the benefits of the new regulations may well outweigh their costs, particularly for countries with large banks which pose a systemic risk. For host countries in CEE, with small, traditionally oriented banks, the opposite may be true. Their pre-and post-crisis experience support the assertion that strong banks, following healthy business models and operating in a competitive market structure, create a sound banking system. Literature N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 28 29
